This paper develops a model based on Schumpeter's process of creative destruction. It departs from existing models of endogeneous growth in emphasizing obsolescence of old technologies induced by the accumulation of knowledge and the resulting process or industrial innovations. This has both positive and normative implications for growth. In positive terms, the prospect of a high level of research in the future can deter research today by threatening the fruits of that research with rapid obsolescence. In normative terms, obsolescence creates a negative externality from innovations, and hence a tendency for laissez-faire economies to generate too many innovations, i.e too much growth. This "business-stealing" effect is partly compensated by the fact that innovations tend to be too small under laissez-faire.
1.

INTRODLJCION
This paper presents a model of endogenous stochastic growth, based on Schuxnpecers idea of creative desiruction. We begin from the belief, supported by many empirical studies starting with Solow (1957) , that a large proportion of economic growth in developed counthes is atthbutable to improvement in technology rather than the accumulation of capital. The paper models technological progress as occurring in the form of innovations, which in turn result from the activities of research firms.
We depart from existing models of endogenous growth (Rorner, 1986 (Rorner, , 1988 and Lucas, 1988) in two fundamental respects. First, we emphasize the fact that technological progress creates losses as well as gains, by rendering obsolete old sidils, goods, markets, and manufacturing processes. This has both positive and normative implications for growth. In positive terms, the prospect of a high level of research in the future can deter research today by threatening the fruits of that research with rapid obsolescence. In normative terms, obsolescence creates a negative externality from innovations, and hence a tendency for laissez-faire to generate too much growth.
Obsolescence does not fit well into existing models of endogenous growth. Those models have only positive externalities, in the form of technology spillovers, and thus tend to generate too little growth. The closest in spirit to our model is that of Romer (1988) . In that model innovations consist of the invention of new intermediate goods, neither better nor worse than existing ones. Once invented a good remains in production forever. Growth takes place because of the lengthening of the list of available intermediate goods. This model does a good job of capturing the division-of--labor aspect of growth. But adding obsolescence, by allowing old goods to be displaced by the inuoduction of new goods, may eliminate growth in this nd of model (see Deneckere and Judd, 19861) .
Our second departure is that we view the growth process as discontinuous. We share the view taken by many economic historians that individual technological breakthroughs have aggregate effects, that the uncertainty of innovations does not average out across indusuies. 1 This view is supported by recent empirical evidence of authors such as Nelson and Plosser (1982) and Campbell and Manltiw (1987) that the uend component of an economy's GNP includes a substantial random element.2
Existing models of endogenous growth do not produce a random end, unless exogenous technology shocks are added to the model, as is done by King and Rebelo (1988) .
We take the view that technology shocks should not be regarded as exogenous in an analysis that seeks to explain the economic decisions underlying the accumulation of knowledge.
Instead, we suppose that they are entirely the result of such decisions. Statistical innovations in GNP are produced by economic innovations, the distribution of which is determined by the equilibrium amount of research. This makes the disthbution of technology shocks endogenous to the model.3
In maldng both of these departures from recent models of endogenous growth we take our inspiration from Schumpeter (1942, p.83 , his emphasis):
The fundamental impulse that sets and keeps the capitalist engine in motion comes from the new consumers' goods, the new methods of production or nansportarion, the new marlcets,...(This processj incessantly revolutionizes the economic smicture within, incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new one. This process of Creative Destruction is the essential fact about capitalism. In Schumpeter's view, capitalist growth is inherently uncertain. Fundamental breakthroughs are the essence of the process, and they affect the entire economy. However, the uncertainty is endogenous to the system, because the probability of a breakthrough depends upon the level of research, which in turn depends upon the the monopoly rents that constitute "the prizes offered by capitalist society to the successful innovator." (1942, p.102) Thus, "economic life itself changes its own data, by fits and starts." (1934, p.62 ).
The present paper develops a simple model that articulates these basic Schumpeterian elements. Although it is quite special in some dimensions we believe it is also simple and flexible enough to serve as a prototype model of growth through creative destruction.4 2.
THE BASIC MODEL a. Assumptions
Tnere are four classes of uadeable objects: land, labor, a consumption good, and a continuum of intermediate goods i e fO,1]. There is also a continuum of identical infinitely-lived individuals, with mass N, each endowed with a one-unit flow of labor, and each with identical intertemporally additive preferences defined over lifetime consumption, with the constant rate of time preference r> 0. Except in section 5 below, we assume a constant marginal utility of consumption ar each date; thus r is also the unique rate of interest in the economy. There is no disutility from supplying labor. There is also a fixed supply H of land.
The consumption good is produced using land and the intermediate goods, subject to constant returns. Since H is fixed we can express the production function as: Labor has an alternative use to producing intermediate goods. It can also be used in research, which produces a random sequence of innovations. The Poisson anival rate of innovations in the economy at any instant is n, where n is the flow of labor used in research and . a constant parameter given by the technology of research. There is no memory in this technology, since the arrival rare depends only upon the current flow of input to research, not upon past research.5
Time is continuous, and indexed by t 0. Tne symbol t = 0,1... denotes the interval starting with the th innovation (or with = 0 in the case of t = 0) and ending just before the t+l. The length of each interval is random. If the constant flow of labor n is applied to research in interval t, its length will be exponentially disnibuted with parameter Each innovation consists of the invention of a new line of intermediate goods, whose use as inputs allows more efficient methods to be used in producing consumption goods. We have in mind such 'input' innovations6 as the steam engine, the airplane, and the computer, whose use made possible new methods of production in mining, transportation, and banking.
An innovation need, not, however, be as revolutionary as these examples, but might consist instead of a new generation of intermediate goods, similar to the old ones.
Specifically, use of the new line of intermediate goods reduces the cost parameters c(i) in (2.1) by the factori E (0,1). We assume away all lags in the diffusion of technology.7 The most modern intermediate good is always produced in each sector, and the unit-cost parameter during interval t is the same for all sectors; thus:
where c0 is the initial value given by history. (Of course, it is always possible to produce the consumption good using an old technology, with a correspondingly old line of intermediate The innovator offers each patent for sale at a price equal to the expected present value of the monopoly rents accruing to the patent. The buyer pays that price as a lump sum in exchange for unconsuained use of the patent. Thus we implicitly rule out royalties and other conungent connacts between the innovator and the local monopolist. The force of this resniction will be discussed in (d) below where it is argued that without the resthction the two parties would want a connact with negative royalties. The resuiction might therefore be rationalized either by noting that negative royalties are not in fact observed, or by referring to costs of monitoring the output of the intermediate good.
No patent covers the use of a new intermediate good in the consumption-good sector.
The idea behind this assumption is that potential uses of the new good are too obvious, even before its invention, to be patented. The assumption might also be rationalized by the observation that important innovations like the ones mentioned above have had widespread uses too numerous and diffuse for anyone to monopolize them. The local monopolist's objective is to maximize the expected present value of the flow of profits over the cutrent intervaL When the interval ends so do the rents. The only uncertainty in the decision problem arises because the length of the interval is random.
Because no one operates in a positive measure of sectors the monopolist takes as given the amount of research at each time, and hence also takes as given the length of the interval.
Because of this and because the cost of the patent is sunk, the monopolist's sategy will be simply to maximize the flow of operating profits it at each instant.
In equilibrium all prices and quantities are constant throughout the interval. Also, by symme'y, the same quantity xt will be chosen by each monopolist. This quantity will also be the total output of intermediate goods in period t, which by (2.2) equals the total employment of labor in manufacmring i.e.:
We can then re-express (2.1) as:
The inverse demand curve facing a monopolist charging the price Pt is the marginal product schedule:
Thus the decision problem is to choose x so as to maximize fF'(x)Ict -w]x, tang c and w as given. The necessary first-order condition is
Assume that the monopolist's marginal-revenue schedule is downward-sloping:
This condition holds automatically when F" < 0; we show in Appendix I that it also holds when F comes from a CES production function. It follows from (2.5) and A.1 that there is a unique solution to the decision problem:
where is strictly decreasing. Thus the demand for labor in the intermediate industry is a decreasing function of the cost (in terms of the consumption good) of producing one efficiency unit of an intermediate good.
Likewise we can express the monopolist's price and flow of profits as: For future use, we also assume: Assumption A.2: (0) = , (o.) = 0.
We have not allowed the local monopolist's decision problem to be consttuined by potential competition from the holder of the previous patent. This is because if the consaint were potentially binding; i.e. if the innovation were non-drastic in the usual sense (see, for example Tirole, 1988, ch.1O) then the current patent would be of greatest value to the holder of the previous patent, who would face no such competition. Thus our model predicts that non-drastic innovations would be implemented by incumbent producers, whereas drastic innovations would generally be implemented by new firms. This is in accordance with several empirical studies to the effect that incumbent firms implement less fundamental innovations than do new ennants. (See, for example, Scherer, 1980.) Whether or not the innovation is drastic is determined by whether or not a competitive producer of the consumption good would incur a loss buying from the previous monopolists, at a price equal to the unit cost w. Thus the condition for a drastic innovation is C(p,w) > where CC) is the unit-cost function uniquely associated with the production function F, and p is the equilibrium price of land. The latter is detexmined by the conditions for competitive equilibrium in the markets for land and the consumption good.
where Pt is the equilibrium market price of all other intermediate goods, given by (2.7).
The special case of a Cobb-Douglas production is defined by:
It is straightforward to verify that in this case: (2.10) x = (cw/a2), (2.11) (2.12) = -and innovations will be drastic if and only if: (2.13) y<cz.
c. Research
There are no contemporaneous spiliovers in the research sector, that is, a research firm employing z will experience innovations with a Poisson arrival rate z, and these arrivals will be independent of other firms research employment i = -z.9 Let W be the value of a research firm after the 1th innovation, and let Vt be the value of patents from the 1th innovation. If the firm makes an innovation it will receive V÷1. x It is clear now why a successful innovator would want to offer a conttact with negative royalties. Such a connact would induce each local monopolist to produce more than This would have two effects on V, as given by (2.17). First, it would reduce the numerator below the maximal value given by (2.8). Second, it would also reduce the denominator by reducing n, through (2.19). In the neighborhood of the zero-royalty solution analyzed above the former effect would be a second-order small by the envelope theorem, but the latter would not. Thus the seller of the th line of patents would want negative royalties so as to discourage creative desmiction duiing interval r. The local monopolists would not attempt to discourage creative desttuction on their own by producing more than (cw) in the absence of negative royalties, because each one is too small to affect n. Using (2.6) and the fact that is an invertible function, we can write w = Multiplying both sides of (2.20) by c and using the identity: c1 =
we obtain:
which we can re-express by the following first-order difference equation:
where:
We define a perfect foresight equilibrium (PFE) as a sequence (xe) in (0, N] satisfying (3.2) for all t 0. In PFE everyone can predict the future evolution of the endogenous variables (we, x, y ire, n, V) with certainty.'4 However, the length of each interval (in real time ic), as well as the identity of each innovator, is random. The characterization of PFE is simplified by the following:
Lemma 1 follows from the fact that both and are decreasing functions. The economic interpretation is as follows: A foreseen increase in x1 will raise the reward .
V1
to the next innovator on the one hand it raises the flow of monopoly rents and on the other hand it reduces the amount of research and hence the amount of creative desuuction next interval (the effect in the denominator). The increase in V1
will raise the equilibrium wage w this period (if x <N), which in turn will induce the intermediate monopolists to reduce their demand for labor this period, x.
Because (3.2) is forward-looking, history does not determine a unique value of x0 in PFE. Typically, there will be a continuum of PFE indexed by the initial value x0. However there will only be a finite number of periodic uajectories to which any PFE could converge asymptotically. More precisely:
Proposition 1: All PFE are. or converge asymptotically to one of the fol1owin:
-a stationary equilibrium (SE) with positive growth.
-SE with zero growth.
-a "real" 2-cycle, or -a "no-growth teap" (NGT').
Furthermore there always exists a unique SE.
We define as a steady state = 5(i). In SE the economy experiences balanced growth in the sense that the allocation of employment between manufacturing () and research (fi=N-)remainsconstanL Gmwthispositiveifi<Nandzeroif=N,because there will be innovations if and only if labor is allocated to research.
We define real 2-cycle as a pair (x0, x1) such than
x°= (x1), x1 = 5(x°), x1 s x° and N x°, x1).
Then a real 2-cycle corresponds to PFE in which manufacturing employment oscillates between two different values with each succeeding innovation. High manufacturing employment in odd intervals raises the reward to research during even intervals, and hence depresses manufacturing employment during even intervals, through the mechanism discussed above. Likewise, low manufacturing employment in even intervals raises manufacturing employment in odd intervals.
A "no-growth' n'ap is a pair (x°, x1) such that the first three conditions of (3.3) hold,
but N E (x0, x1). As shown in Figure 2 below, NGT exists when (3(N) <G'(N) 3 X. Even though iNGT defines an infinitesequence (x}0, the oscillation of the economy will stop afterperiod 1. Fromthenon the economywiflpezformas ifin SE with zerogrowth.
The interpieraflon of NGT is that the prospect of low manufacturing employment in even periods so depresses the incentive to research in odd periods that research stops. As we shall In particular, for a fixed value of y, ?, r, N, a necessary and sufficient condition for positive growth is that the parameter a be sufficiently small: a < a* /( + 'er) < 1.
To interpret this result note that a is an inverse measure of monopoly power in each As we have seen, NGT will exist if!:
Figure 3
In particular NGT will always exist when the interest xte r is saaicientiy small.16 Note that the smaller r (or rA), the easier it is to satisfy (3.5): in other words, "no-.growth tap" equilibria are more likely to exist in an economy that possesses a positive balanced-growth equilibrium! Then, from Proposition 2, we know that there exists a real 2-cycle whenever a is small and G(N) <xC (rA small). We can surrmiarize the conclusions obtained in the Cobb-Douglas case by the following picture. Again can be interpreted as an inverse measure of the degree of monopoly power in the intermediate indusny.
Figure 5
The reason for cycles in this model is sirnilr, but not identical, to the reason for cycles in the model of Shleifer (1986) .'9 In the Shicifer model innovations are exogenous, and there are multiple equilibrium sategies for implementing them, because of an aggregate-demand externality. That externality is present in this model in an intertemporal rather than intersectoral form. As (3.1) makes clear, higher manufacturing output next period raises the flow of monopoly rents next period. As we have seen, it is this effect, together with the effect of creative destruction, that makes x depend inversely upon xt+l, and which therefore makes high manufacturing employment in odd intervals together with low manufacturing employment in even intervals a possible equilibrium configuration.
There are several questions that would need to be addressed before judging the likely empirical relevance of these 2-cycles. One is their observability under realistic expectational assumptions; equilibria that are stable under perfect foresight (as in Figure 4above ) are often unstable under learning (Grandmont and Laroque, 1986) . Another is the size of the resulting output fluctuations; modern economies typically allocate no more than 2 or 3 percent of their
w,,.
(LxcL ,L.N6r) labor force to research. We regard these questions as open. Learning raises many unresolved issues, and even if the movement of labor between manufacturing and research would cause small proportional fluctuations in the level of output it could produce large proportional fluctuations in research, and hence in the growth rate of output. Rather than pursue these questions further we shall focus the rest of the paper on balanced growth equiibri& Accordingly, the main interest of the above analysis is not to propose a theory of cycles but to describe the logic of the model of creative destruction.
BALANCED GROWTH a. Time-Series Properties of Output
One of the benefits of endogenizing technical change is that we can endogenize the average rate of growth (AGR) of the economy. Rather than have AGR depend upon exogenous population growth and/or exogenous technical progress as in the neoclassical growth model, we have made it depend upon various factors that affect the incentive to do research and the fruitfulness of research in reducing production costs. In this sense we are following the seminal contributions of Romer (1986) , Lucas (1988) and others. Another benefit is that we can endogenize the variability of the growth rate (VOR). The variance of what appear in the model as technology shocks depends upon the same economic factors that determine AGR In the extreme case where the incentive to do research is so small as to result in no growth, VGR will also be zero.
We shall now proceed under the assumption that the economy is always in a situation of positive balanced growth. Thus:20 where is defined by:
The following Lemma is an immediate consequence of Lemma 1 and the fact that and are decreasing:
Lernma2: d=G-1<O; >O; J<O; >O;
We then obtain:
Proposition 3: The amount of research performed in a positive balanced growth equilibrium (a) decrease with the rate of interest r.
(b) increase with the arrival parameter . (a) an increase in the interest rare r means an increase in the required rate of rennn on research, whose effect will be to reduce the total investment in R & D.
(b) an increase in the arrival rate ). will have both the positive effect of raising the speed at which research pays (the effect on the numerator of 4.1), and the negative effect of increasing creative desmiction (effect on the denominator). The first effect dominates.21
(c) an increase in the size of each innovation (decrease in y) also increases research by increasing the size of next interval's monopoly rents relative to today's research costs.
(d) an increase in total labor endowment N increases research by increasing, for a given fi, the size of the market that can be "monopolized" by a successful innovator.
We now complete our cornparadve stacs analysis by studying the effect of the degree of monopoly power in the intermediate indusny.
In the Cobb-Douglas case, we saw that a good (inverse) measure of monopoly power was the parameter a. In the general case we can proceed in a similar way and define:
where 0 <a < 1. The elasticity r again depends positively on a.22
We can then show:
This expression decreases with a. The lemma then follows from (4.1). n
We then obtain the following intuitive result:
Proposition 4: An increase in monopoly power (reduction in a) increases the amount of research in a balanced growth eguiiibrium
We now derive an explicit expression for both the average growth rate (AGR) and the variability of the growth rate (VOR) in a balanced growth equilibrium. The volume of real output (i.e. the flow of consumption goods) during interval t is: The positive effect of N on AGR has the unfortunate implication, which Romer (1988) has noted in a similar context, that larger economies should grow faster. In fact, (4.1') in foomote 20 above implies that, in the Cobb-Douglas case, a doubling of population should more than double the growth rate. (These comparisons must be intertemporal rather than international, since we have not dealt with the question of transboundary technology flows.)
We accept the obvious implication that this class of models has little to say, without considerable modification, about the relationship between population size and growth rate.
The variability of output in this model should be distinguished from its variability in existing real business cycle models, for the following reasons. First, the variability of shocks has been endogenized here. An innovation in the statistical sense in real output is the effect of an innovation in the economic sense, the distribution of which depends as we have seen upon economic decisions that respond to parameter changes. We now compare the laissez-faire AGR derived above with the AGR that would be chosen by a social planner whose objective was to maximize the expected present value of utility of consumption y(c). The maximized value of the planner's objective function, Z, when c is historically given, is determined by the following Bellman equation:
The first-order condition an interior solution for this problem is:
It is easily checked that the solution to (4.9) is: There are three differences between (4.12) and (4.14): The first difference is the presence of the term in the denominator of (4.12). This corresponds to the intertemporal spillover effect discussed in section 2(c). A private innovator will capture rent from his innovation for one interval only, whereas the social rent continues forever. Formally it comes from the presence of the term Z÷1 in the definition (4.9) of the social planner's value function Z, whereas no such term appears in the definition (2.17) of the private value of an innovation, V. This effect leads the laissez-faire economy to underinvest in research: i.e.
> X.23
The second difference is the presence of the term . y in the numerator of (4.14).
This corresponds to a "business-stealin' effect. The private innovator does not internalize the loss of surplus to the monopolist whose rents he destroys. It comes formally from the presence of -X(N -x)Z in the social planner's maximand in (4.9), whereas no corresponding subtraction appears in the problem (2.15) solved by the private research firm. This effect leads pnvate firms to ovennvest in research: i.e. x <x
The third difference is the presence of the term ( -1) instead of
the numerator of (4.14). This corresponds to the monopolistic distortion effect. It arises because the flow of returns whose capitalized value the social planner attempts to maximize is total output, whereas the private value V is the capitalized value of profits, itt. This distortiofl can work in either direction. In the Cobb-Douglas case it is non-existent, since in that case
(In the Cobb-Douglas case output and profits are propornonal to one another:
= (1-_ct)y, so the effect amounts to nothing more than a muldplicative constant in the social-planner's decision-problem.)
The intertemporal spiilover effect will dominate when the size of innovations is large (i.e. y is small)-in this case the private reward to research will be small compared to the big social reward-and laissez-faire will generate an AGR less than optimaL2' On the other hand when there is much monopoly power (a close to zero in the Cobb-Douglas case) and innovations are not too large (i.e. y is not too small), the business-stealing effect will dominate, leading to an AGR under laissez-faire which exceeds the optimal level of average Let denote the value to a reseaxth firm of m2ldrlg the th innovation at time t.
Define xCt), w(t) and xt) analogously. We confine attention to balanced growth equilibria, in which x(t) = (constant). Then % = (c('r)w(t)) as before, so c(r)w(t) = cw (constant).
Likewise ,tt) = (cw)/c(t).
As before, V('t) is the expected present value of it evaluated over interval t. Since icc) grows at the constant exponential raze over this interval, it foUows that it (jv) (4.16) () = t t r+Xâ-g Therefore:
(ii))/c(v)
The first-order condition for positive research to occur is, as before, w(r) = Thus the level of output in a (non-degenerate) SE is given by:
This equation is identical to (4.1) except for the term -g'i in the denominator. Thus the previous analysis of stationary states was a special case, with g = 0.
The AGR under laissez-faire is given by:
(where t is the number of innovations that occurred until date t) Given our assumption that innovations follow a Poisson process with arrival rare )... ñ, we have:
Hence:
In words, the average growth rate now derives from two components: a deterministic component due to Ibd (g(N-ñ)) and a random component corresponding to the innovation process (-Xzibry). On the other hand, VGR is given by the same formula as before since the additional growth generated through lbd is deterministic: By contiast with Section 4(a) above, parameters may affect AGR and VGR in opposite directions: for example, an increase in r will reduce the amount of research a performed in equilibrium, thereby reducing VGR. The effect on AGR is ambiguous: the random part will be reduced as before but the deterutinistic part will increase together with the amount of manufacturing labor = N -ri. In particular AGR will increase if g > -Jiry.
An increase in the speed of learning by doing (i.e. in g) will have a positive direct effect on AGR (equal to g (N -ii) ). It will also indirectly affect AGR by increasing the level of research ri.28 When the initial value of g is sufficiently small (-A.&y -g > 0), the indirect effect will increase AGR. When the initial g is large however, a further increase in g may have a perverse effect on growth by inducing too much research at the expense of learning by doing.
The tendency for lbd to induce too much research is brought out more clearly by the following welfare analysis. Let Z('r) = Z(c(t))
be the social planner's value function. It satisfies the following Bellman equation, analogous to (4.9) above: The economics of this result can be summarized as follows: learning by doing raises the reward to research activities, by raising the net present value of rents from a successful innovation. But it does not raise the marginal profitability of hiring manufacturing workers, since the benefits of lbd are external to the firm (our spillover assumption). This explains why a laissez-faire economy will respond to an increase itt g by investing more in research at the expense of manufacturing. With the social planner things will go the other way around:
intern1izing the effect of Ibd in his decisions, the social planner will respond to an increase in g by putting more workers into manufacturing, thus fewer workers into research. is almost equal to x = x(g = 0).29 Then:
As we have seen, _ > 0. Therefore, if x*(O) is sufficiently close to (0), introducing learning by doing will generate too much growth at the margin:
5.
CONSUMPTION -SMOO1NG: MAKING INNOVATIONS LARGER CAN DEThR RESEARCH
In this section we relax the assumption of constant marginal utility. Instead, the instantaneous utility function has a constant elasticity of marginal utility equal to s> 0. Thus
c1. The pure rate of time preferences is still the constant r> 0. Thus the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is l/. The preceding analysis dealt with the special case of = 0. With 0> 0, consumerS will want to smooth consumption over time, which will affect the equilibrium.
We confine attention to situations of non-degenerate balanced growth. All households are identicaL so all will have equal consumption in equilibrium, equal to yiN. Thus each innovation will reduce the marginal utility of consumption by the factor u' (y÷i/.0/u' (y/N) = '/. Each shareholder of a research firm will thus have a marginal rate of substitution equal to f between the consumption good just before an innovation and the consumption good just after. Accordingly, a research firm will discount the payoff to a successful innovation by the factor f, and its marginal condition for positive research will be (5.1) w=.fVi where V÷1 is the market value in terms of the consumption good of the t + l innovation. Specifically, an increase in the size of innovations (decrease in y) still increases research, and hence increases the average growth rate and its variability, if the elasticity of 31 intet-temporal substitution exceeds unity (c < 1). In this case the decrease in y decreases the left side of (5.3), which causes a decrease in . But if the elasticity of interremporal subsutution is less than unity (c> 1), then an increase in the size of innovations leads to a reduction in research. If the elasticity is sufficiently close to zero this could lead to such a large reduction in research as to reduce AGR and VGR.
The economic interpretation of this new possibility is straightforward. A decrease in raises the payoff to research as measured in units of consumption good. But it also reduces the marginal utility of consumption after the innovation relative to before. Vihen > 1 the latter effect is so strong as to reduce the utility rate of return to research. The effect is similar to the negatively sloped savings schedule that occurs when a> 1 in the standard two-period overlapping generations model with all endowments accruing to the young.
An increase in the intertempoi-al elasticity of substitution (decrease in a) increases the amount of research, and hence also increases the average growth rate and its variability, because it reduces the left side of (5.3). Intuitively, it raises the utility-rate of return to research by reducing the rate at which marginal utility falls after an innovation.
The welfare analysis of balanced-growth equilibria is almost the same as before. The maximized value of the social planner's objective function Z is determined by the Bellman equation: Comparison of (5.5) with (5.3) reveals the same three differences as before between and x.
It is easily verified that if research is
So, as before, laissez-faire may produce either too much or too little research.
ENDOGENOUS SIZE OF II4NOVAflONS: tNNOVATIONS ARE TOO SMALL UNDER LAISSEZ-FAIRE
This section generalizes the analysis of balanced growth developed in section 4 by allowing research firms to choose not only the frequency but also the size of innovations. We
show that the equilibrium size of innovations will be independent of everything in the model except the technology of research firms. Thus all the comparative-statics effects previously analyzed remain unchanged. There is, however, a change in the welfare analysis.
Specifically under laissez-faire innovations will be too small. This new effect will reinforce the intertemporal-sPiilOver effect in tending to make the economy grow too slowly.
Rather than assume a linear research technology at the individual firm level, it is helpful to assume an infinitely elastic supply of identical research firms with U-shaped cost curves. Assume that to experience innovations with a cost reduction factor at the rate a firm must hire v() units of labor, with v1 > 0, v2 <0. We look for a stationary equilibrium with a constant aggregate level of research employment a, with and equal to the constants z and y within each research firm, and with cw = cw = constant for a]). t. Since n/v(z,'() is the number of firms, the aggregate arrival rate of innovations is [nlv(z,y)]Xz = (Ik)n, where k = v(z,y)/z is a constant.
In a stationary equilibrium, the intermediate demand for manufacturing labor, i.e.
• x = N -a, is given by:
md the value of the t+l innovation is:
If a firm choosing j makes the (t÷l)St innovation, it will make the wage rate rise to:
During interval t, the research finn takes as given that will be determined by (6.1) and (6.2), and rakes A and w as given. Thus its decision problem is:
Assume that (6.3) has an interior solution. By free enny, the maximized expression in (6.3) must equal zero. From this and the first-order conditions:
3) the output of research is proportional to Therefore a research firm's average cost is proportional to:
Our assumption of U-shaped cost is: Assumption A.3: K(z,?) is sthctly convex.
It follows from (A.3) that (6.4) and (6.5) define a unique equilibrium combination (z,y); specifically, the combination that minimizes average cost: (6.6) (z,?) = arg mm K(z,7).
Since none of the parameters (r,X,N) enter (6.6), it follows that y and z are independent of them. Similarly, the size of each innovation is independent of the deee of monopoly power. Thus all comparative-statics results go through as before except for those describing the effects of varying the size of innovations, which are no longer relevant since the size is endogenouS.
To conduct the welfare analysis, note that the social planner's maximized objective function Z(c) is given by the Bellman equation:
where m is the number of finns.31
The first-order conditions for this problem are:
It is easily checked that the solution to (6.7) is: 
Comparison of (6.11) with (6.12) reveal the same three distortions as before on the equilibrium * amount of research. In addition, the fact that y> y will tend to create too little research. The a fact that k ic will also generate a distortion. As before, the total level of research may be too much or too little.
7.
RANDOM ARRIVAL PARAMETER CREATIVE DESTRUCTION CAN DESTROY
GROWTH
In this section we allow the arrival parameter ?. to vary randomly. This generalization illustrates the force of creative destruction by allowing an increase in in some states of the world to deter research in other states. In fact, we present an example where in the limit as the value of in one state becomes infinite, the average growth rare falls to zero. where q1 is the asymptotic fraction of rime spent in state i.
Our example has rn = 2 and = 1/2 V. It is easily verified that in this case:
q1--1--11 '22 37 From (7.2) and (7.3):
22 nit A1n1 +
To complete the example, take the Cobb-Douglas case (F(x) = x) and suppose = = 1/2, and r = N = = 1. Using (2.10) and (2.12), (7.1) can be rewritten as: to be discouraged in the other state, through the threat of creative desuction, to such an extent that growth is eliminated.
CONCLUSION
We have presented a model of economic growth based on Schumpeters process of creative desucuon. Growth results exclusively from technological progress, which in turn results from competition among research firms that generate innovations. Each innovation consists of a new line of intermediate goods that can be used to produce final output more efficiently than before. Research firms are motivated by the prospect of monopoly rents that can be captured when a successful innovation is patented. But those rents in turn will be desnoyed by the next innovation, which will render obsolete the existing line of intermediate goods.
The model possesses a unique balanced-growth equilibrium, in which there is a constant allocanon of labor between research and manufacturing. In that equilibrium the log of GNP follows a random walk with drift. The size of the drift is the economy's average growth rate, and the variance of the increments is the variability of the growth rate. Both these parameters of growth are endogenous to the model, and depend upon the rate of time preference and elasticity of intertemporal substitution of the representative household, and upon the size and likelihood of innovations resulting from research.
As Schumpeter argued, the degree of market power available to someone implementing an innovation will also be an important determinant of growth. We have parametrize"& market power, and shown that it has a positive effect upon both the average growth rate and its variability.
The average growth rate and its variability are also affected by the extent of learning-by--doing in the manufacturing sector of the economy. The greater the coefficient of learning-by-doing, the more research will be undertaken. This will raise the average rate of growth attributable to research, but it may decrease the growth attributable to learning-bydoing, because the only way for society to engage in more research is to take labor out of manufacturing.
The average growth rate may be more or less than socially optimal, because there are two counteracting distortions. The first is a technology spillover. A successful innovation produces iowledge that other researchers can use without compensation to the innovator.
The counteracting distortion is a "business-stealing" effect. The private research firm does not internalize the loss to others due to obsolescence resulting from his innovations. We also show that innovations aie too small under laissez-faire, again because of the business-Stealing effect.
Learning by doing introduces a further distortion because it is external to the individual manufacturing firm. This distortion tends to produce too little manufacturing, and hence too much research. Whether it produces too much or too little growth depends upon the relative 39 efficacy of learning by doing and research as sources of growth.
Under some circumstances the model possesses equilibria in addition to the unique one with balanced growth. One is a 'no-growth uap" in which the economy stops growing in finite time because of the (rational) expectation that if one more innovation were to take place it would be followed by a flurry of research activity. This expectation makes it so likely that the rents accruing to the producer of the next innovation will be desuoyed quickly that it is not worth uying to create the innovation, and research stops. We conclude by noting directions for future research. It would be useful to allow the size of innovation eventually to fall, to allow for the possibility that technology is niumately bounded. Also to include a richer intersectoral structure to study both the positive dynamics of diffusion and the normative effects of intersectoral spillover. Let F(x) = (x + where 0 <p < I.
We have:
. (x + H)11
-2)(x + HP)1 3px1x2
Therefore:
Derivadon of (3.7)
We have: 2More recent work by Cochrane (1988) shows that this evidence is not, however, conclusive.
3Thus policy analysis based on the K.ing-Rebelo model would be subject to the Lucas critique because it neats the variability of growth as invariant to the policy determinants of growth.
4Mention should also be made of the preliminary work of Corriveau (1988) , who is developing a similar model of growth and cycles in a discrete time setting. The discrreness of time In Comveaus model inaoduces complications from the possibility of simultaneous innovations, which we avoid by our assumption of continuous time. In Con-iveaus framework all innovations are non-drastic, and it is not possible to parameterize the degree of monopoly power in the economy as we have done.
5Some consequences of inn-oducing memory are discussed in section 8 below. 6Scherer (1984) combines process-and input-oriented R and D into a measure of 'used" R and D, which he distinguishes from pure product R and D. He estimates that during the period 1973-1978 in U.S. industry the social rate of return to "used" R and D lay between 71% and 104%, whereas the return to pure product R and D was insignificant.
7Graual diffusion could be introduced by allowing the c.: st parameter after each innovation to follow a predetermined but gradual path asympotically approaching the limit c, and then to jump to c upon the next innovation and follow a gradual path approaching c1. This would produce a cycle in research within each interval, as the gradual fall in costs induces manufacturing firms to hire more and more workers out of research until the next innovation occurs.
8Note that this description of technology implies increasing returns in the production of the consumption good, the ultimate inputs of which are land, labor (as embodied in the intermediate goods) and knowledge (as embodied in the cs). If land and labor alone were doubled, then the flow of intermediate input would also double, and hence, by the assumption of constant returns, final output would just double. Since there are constant returns in these two factors holding the third constant, there are increasing returns in all three.
The technological specification of the economy follows that of Griliches (1979) . There exist empirical studies casting doubt on our assumptions that there are constant returns in research in that a doubling of research will double the rate of innovations (Griliches, 1989) , that there is no variability in the size of innovations (Pakes, 1986) , and that there is no variability in the Poisson arrival rate of innovations (Hausman, Hall, and Griliches, 1984) . The first two assumptions can be relaxed with only notational difficulties. The third is relaxed in section 7 below.
9The alternative assumption that research firms have identical U-shaped functions with a small efficient scale produces identical results. This alternative is employed in section 6 below.
lOBellman equations like (2.14) axe standard in the patent-race literature (see Tirole, 1988, cli. 10) . Several more are innoduced below. This footnote presents an alternative derivation. Let T, T, and T" be, respectively, the time of the next innovation, the tune at which the other firms would experience their first innovation if they held employment constant at forever, and the time at which this firm would experience its first innovation if it held its employment constant at z forever. Under the no-spillover assumption. T' and T" are independent random variables, expoentially distributed with respective parameters 2LiT and Xz, and T = mm (T', T"). It follows that, as already mentioned, T is exponentially disthbuted with parameter + z) and that the probability that the next innovation will be made by this firm, conditional on the date of that innovation, Prob {T = T' T) is the constant + z).
Thus, conditional on T, the value of the research firm is:
= eT[Wt+i The last equation is equivalent to (2.14).
"It is straightforward to relax the assumption of complete spiflover by allowing the th innovator to have an advantage in finding the t+1 innovation; to have an arnval parameter .' > .. We have worked out this analysis under the assumption of U-shaped cost with small efficient scale (see footnote 9), with no important change in results.
120ur analysis of research is derived from the patent-race literature surveyed by Reinganum (1987) and mole (1988, ch. 10) . Within that literature the paper closest to ours is Reinganum (1985) , which emphasizes the affinity to creative destruction. Most other papers do not have the sequence of races necessary for creative destruction. Our paper goes beyond that literature by embedding the sequence of races in a general-equilibrium setting. Thus (a) the flow of profits ir resulting from an innovation will depend upon the amount of research during the next interval, (b) our welfare criterion is the expected lifetime utility of the representative consumer, (c) we characterize the time-series properties of GNP, and (d) in section 5 we find that the size of innovations affects the rate of discount applied to research. In addition, the analysis in section 6 of the endogenous determination of the size of innovations, and the analysis of cycles in section 3, go beyond anything we have found in the patent-race literature.
3G is well defined on (0,N), by Al.
14The methods of Azariadis (1981) or Woodford (1986) could also be used to construCt 47 rational-expectations sunspot equilibria, at least in some cases. 5This distinguishes our model from the ,owth model with externalities developed in Romer (1986) , which may have no steady state. By continuity, (3.6) will hold for r (or rA) positive but small.
17A real 2-cycle also exists if G(N) > xC and Y() > 1. However, this can never occur in the Cobb-Douglas case (see Aghion and Howitt, 1988) .
1S,1(X)El9Likewise, the reason for cycles is similar to that underlying the chaotic fluctuations in the model of Deneckere and Judd (1986) . They model innovations as Romer (1988) does, with no creative desuuict±on.. Their dynamics are backward looking, because the incentive to innovate depends upon the existing number of products, which depends upon past innovative activity, whereas their assumption that monopoly rents are not desnoyed by future innovations makes the incentive independent of future innovative activity. Their cycles arise because the only rest-point of their backward-looking dynamics is unstable.
201n the Cobb-Douglas case, (4.1) can be expressed by: 2r1(x,a)E-F'(x)/xF"(x)= f(x) f'(x) (1-a)xff'(x)]2 -xf(x)r(x) 23Two additional kinds of spillover can easily be included. First, researchers could benefit from the flow of others' research, so that an individual firm's arcival rate would be a constant returns function (z,n) of its own and others' research. Second, there could be an exogenous Poisson arrival rate ji. of imitations that costlessly circumvent the patent laws and clone the existing line of intermediate goods. Both would have the effect of lowering AGR. Also as we showed in Aghion and Howitt (1988) , the inclusion of p. would innoduce another source of cycles in the economy, since each imitation would make the intermediate rndusiry perfectly competitive, which would raise manufacturing employment, until the next innovation arrives.
24More formally, as y fails to the lower limitr XN x* approaches zero, whereas j approaches a snictly positive limit. 26There seems to be a presumption among empirical students of R and D that spillovers will dominate business stealing in a welfare comparison. See, for example, Griliches (1979, p. 99) . 271he formal source of these different results is that in our model research is a separate activity from the production of the goods embodying hiowledge. The activity whose doing creates external learning is the production. Doing it more intensively requires less research to be undertaken. Romer follows Arrow (1962) in assuming that the two activities are inseparably bundled, thereby eliminaung this tradeoff. 28This follows immediately from equation (4.18), using the fact that both and Z are decreasing function.
291n the Cobb-Douglas case: (1)_÷ 30Someone who gave up a marnal unit of consumption to buy shares in a local patent would receive a constant dividend of ir/V until T, the date of the next innovation. The expected utility gain of the transaction would be: T ________ ErIo u'(ct)(r/V)dr = r + Equating this to the expected utility cost u'(c) yields (2.17).
31We assume that no non-negativity consnaints bind.
3ZWe have examined the consequences of a limited nd of R and D capital by allowing for the arrival parameter to increase randomly in the middle of an interval, and then to remain high until the next innovation, so that the probability of an innovation depends not just upon the flow of research but also upon the length of rime over which the innovation has been sought. The analysis is formally like that of section 7 above, and most of the comparative-statics results of section 4 go through.
